Abstract: High growth, liquid Chilean firms have greater relative weights in U.S. equity portfolios, but the most important determinant of a firm's portfolio weight is whether it is listed on a U.S. exchange. Crosslisting does not, however, appear to have permanent benefits: Weights in U.S. portfolios of firms that crosslisted in the mid-1990s increased at the expense of firms that cross-listed earlier. Put another way, firms appear to be able to access international capital at the time of the cross-listing, but this access may well be short-lived.
1 See Chari and Henry (2001 , 2002a , and 2002b ) for analyses of firm-level returns and capital stocks after a liberalization.
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I. Introduction
A wide and growing literature has documented the effects of financial market liberalization. Though debates are ongoing, evidence now suggests that when emerging markets liberalize they experience capital inflows, an investment boom, increased growth, and a decrease in the cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , Henry (2000a Henry ( , 2000b , Kim and Singal (2000) , Edison and Warnock (forthcoming), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) ). A still outstanding question, however, is whether these effects are countrywide or firm-specific. For example, after a country liberalizes its financial markets, is the average firm able to access international capital markets, or is international capital only available to certain firms? 1 We address these questions by focusing on a narrow group of firms and a narrow but important group of global investors. Specifically, we analyze high quality survey data on U.S.
investors' holdings of individual Chilean equities. The firm-level holdings data allow us to identify the roles of firm characteristics that influence weights in U.S. portfolios. And, because the surveys were conducted as of two points in time, we are able to analyze the evolution of those portfolio weights.
Studies have examined the effects of firm characteristics on foreigners' portfolios in industrial countries. For example, it is apparent from the work of Kang and Stulz (1997) , henceforth KS, and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) , henceforth DR, that in industrial countries foreigners overweight large firms and firms that produce internationally traded goods, possibly because investors possess more information about such firms.
Our results suggest that while some aspects of these previous findings apply to emerging markets, there are also important differences. For example, as in previous studies, we find that investors prefer liquid, high growth firms. However, characteristics that are related to the amount of readily available firm-level information-size and producing an internationally traded good-do not appear to influence U.S. investors' decisions in Chile. Indeed, we find that firms that produce internationally traded goods are underweighted relative to those that produce non-traded goods.
Our more important findings concern the effects of international cross listings on portfolio weights and the implications for the breadth (widespread or firm-specific) of access to international capital markets. It is by now well known that cross listings, because they often involve opting into stricter regulatory environments, have an important information content (Coffee (1999) , Stulz (1999) , Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2001) , Lang, Lins, and Miller (forthcoming)). Our results are consistent with these findings: The most important determinant of a firm's weight in U.S. portfolios is whether it is listed on a U.S. exchange and hence subject to U.S. investor protection regulations. But we go a step further by examining the evolution of firms' weights in U.S.
portfolios. We find that while the average Chilean firm did not gain a larger share in U.S. portfolios between 1994 and 1997, those firms that cross-listed during that period experienced substantially increased weights in U.S. portfolios. They did so, however, not at the expense of firms that never cross-listed, but of those that had cross-listed prior to 1994. That is, firms that cross-list gain access to international capital, but the access may well be short-lived.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our sample and provide summary statistics of the main explanatory variables. In Section III, we more formally describe the determinants of firms' weights in U.S. portfolios by presenting results from multivariate regressions, while delving further into the role of cross-listings and questions of the breadth of access to international capital. Section IV concludes. 2 Publicly available country-level data from the benchmark surveys are presented in Treasury Department and Federal Reserve Board (2000) and analyzed in Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (forthcoming) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2001) . 3 We use the May 1999 Worldscope CD in an attempt to get complete coverage for 1997 while minimizing the loss of data due to "dead" companies. 4 Relative weight is the weight in U.S. portfolios relative to the weight in the world portfolio. and firm characteristics: quintile analysis and t-statistics from bivariate regressions. Here, and for the rest of the paper, as in DR foreign ownership is defined as y i = T i US /T i M -1, which is the ratio of security i's weight in U.S. equity portfolios to its weight in the world market portfolio, minus one.
Hence, a y-value of negative one indicates no foreign ownership, the underweighting (or bias) decreases as the value moves closer to zero, and investors overweight equities that have a positive
y-value.
The characteristics we use are as in KS and DR, as long as Worldscope coverage for
Chilean firms was sufficient. 6 We add one additional variable (the IFC Investable Weight) and adjust another (percent of shares closely held) for errors in the Worldscope database. The attributes we examine include:
(a) Size: Previous studies have shown that both U.S. institutions (Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001)) and foreigners (KS and DR) have preferences for larger firms.
In the case of foreign investment, one might argue that information asymmetries might be less severe for larger firms, in which case a large firm preference would be consistent with Merton's (1987) model in which investors prefer firms they know. We measure firm size by (log) market capitalization, which comes from the S&P/IFC EMDB. The quintile analysis in Table 2 (c) Debt-to-equity ratio: Debt-to-equity is a leverage ratio generally comprising shortand long-term debt plus the current portion of long term debt over common equity. Firms with higher leverage are more financially vulnerable and, thus, might attract less foreign investment.
There does not, however, appear to be a meaningful relationship between bias and this variable.
(d) Current ratio: Current ratio, calculated as current assets over current liabilities, indicates the firm's ability to meet short-term obligations. Firms with a high current ratio are in better financial health (at least in the short-term) and, thus, might be more attractive to foreign investors. DR find that this is indeed true in Sweden, but Table 2 provides no indication that
Chilean firms with higher current ratios attract more U.S. investment.
(e) Beta: Beta, which we have calculated beta relative to the global market using 7 If Chile were not integrated with global markets, beta measured with respect to the local (Chilean) market would be more appropriate. In our sample period, however, it was open to foreign investment and thus more likely integrated than segmented. Furthermore, a local beta is insignificant in bivariate and multivariate regressions. (h) Book-to-market ratio: Book-to-market is a stock performance ratio given by the book value per share over the market price at year end. We have no prior on this variable. Low book-to-market "growth" stocks have been shown to be favored by mutual funds (Carhart(1997) ), but other evidence suggests that institutional investors prefer high book-to-market "value" stocks (Gompers and Metrick (2001)). In line with results in KS, the quintile rankings and bivariate regression results indicate that U.S. investors prefer Chilean growth stocks.
(i) Turnover: Turnover, calculated as the value of trading in a stock over the previous twelve months (from the EMDB) over its market capitalization, is a measure of the liquidity of a firm's shares. Some investors may be willing to pay a premium for liquidity and, as DR found, the quintiles and t-statistic show that greater liquidity is associated with greater foreign ownership.
(j) Dividend yield: Dividend yield is a stock performance ratio calculated by dividends per share over the market price at year-end. Yield has been used by Del Guercio (1996) as a "prudence" proxy-stocks paying higher yields might be considered safer-and has predictive power for returns (Fama and French (1988) , Campbell and Shiller (1988), Harvey (1995) ). DR, however, report a negative significant relationship between dividend yield and foreign ownership, as do Gompers and Metrick (2001) for institutions. We do not find conclusive evidence; the quintiles point to a negative relationship, but this is not confirmed by the t-statistic.
III. The Role of Cross-Listings
The quintile analysis and bivariate regressions suggest which characteristics will be more important determinants of U.S. holdings of individual Chilean stocks. Because information for all 8 Beta is significantly related to holdings in Table 2 , but it is never significant in multivariate regressions. Because including it only reduces the number of usable observations without affecting our results, we do not report beta in multivariate regressions. 9 All of the Chilean firms in our sample that listed on U.S. exchanges did so through Level II (2)), its coefficient has the expected sign but is not significant and investable weight and turnover lose significance.
The third set of regression results displayed in Table 3 include the effect of cross-listings through a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is listed on a U.S. exchange. The results in Table 3 prompt a further investigation into the role of cross-listings. In Table   4 we provide information on the types of Chilean firms that list their shares abroad. Saudagaran (1988) shows that size is the most significant determinant in a firm's tendency to list. Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) show in a sample of European firms that cross-listing firms are large, growing, and R&D intensive and have higher foreign sales and higher turnover. In Table 4 , probit results
suggests that large, growing Chilean firms list abroad, consistent with previous results.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that U.S. investors prefer listed Chilean firms and cross-listed Chilean firms are large and growing. While endogenizing the cross-listing decision is 11 The limitations of Worldscope prevent the inclusion of the change in book-to-market ratio in the changes regression. 12 The lack of significance of the change in investable weight owed to an across-theboard increase in investability over this period.
10 not feasible in this study-doing so properly would require higher frequency accounting and holdings data-we can investigate the determinants of changes between 1994 and 1997 in firms' weights in U.S. investors' portfolios. This approach is, in some sense, a natural experiment; of the nineteen Chilean firms in our sample that have listed on a U.S. exchange, more than half did so between 1994 and 1997. Table 5 presents the results of a regression on the change in the bias measure due to changes in the explanatory variables between 1994 and 1997.
11 If a firm listed shares between March 1994
and December 1997, the listing variable is one. The table shows that firms that became larger or more investable did not experience a significant increase in foreign ownership. 12 On the other hand, firms with increased liquidity (turnover) had a significant increase in foreign ownership.
The second regression shown in Table 5 shows that when the listing variable is included, its effect dominates all other variables. The highly significant coefficient estimate of 0.249 implies that firms that were not cross-listed as of March 1994 but listed by December 1997 saw an increase in the share of U.S. holdings of over 12 percentage points.
Overall, the weights of Chilean firms in U.S. portfolios did not increase from 1994 to 1997, so the sharp increase in the weights associated with firms that cross-listed during that period must have been offset by decreased weights for other firms. The final columns of Table 5 show that this was indeed the case. The increased portfolio weights of firms that cross-listed between 1994 and 1997 were offset by decreased weights, not in those firms that never listed, but by those firms that listed prior to 1994.
To view our results another way, the time line of firms' access to international capital appears to be as follows. Chilean firms typically have minuscule relative weights in U.S. investors' portfolios until they cross-list, at which time they experience an inflow of foreign capital. This inflow, however, is not persistent: When subsequent firms cross-list and gain increased weights in U.S. portfolios, they do so at the expense of firms that cross-listed earlier.
IV. Conclusion
The story that emerges from our analysis of U.S. investors' Chilean equity portfolios is that while growing firms with high liquidity tend to be able to access global capital markets, by far the most important determinant of a firms' weight in international portfolios is whether it has crosslisted on a U.S. exchange. For example, the portion of the average Chilean equity that is held by U.S. investors is only 5.5% if the stock is not cross-listed, but 16% if it is. Moreover, the financing acquired via the cross-listing appears to be a one-time event. U.S. investors buy into firms that cross-list, but do not appear to increase their stakes over time. Strikingly, Chilean firms that crosslisted during the 1994 to 1997 period experienced sharply increased weights in U.S. portfolios, not at the expense not of Chilean firms that had never cross-listed, but of those that had cross-listed earlier.
This paper leaves many open questions. The most important one concerns the nature of financial liberalization and access to international markets. When a country liberalizes, are its firms able to tap international savings? Our results suggests that the ability to access international funds is firm-specific and may not be long-lasting. Table 2 shows the ranking of firms based on several characteristics for 1997. Firms are ranked and sorted into quintiles, and averages of the characteristic and foreign ownership are given for each, as well as the overall average and number of observations. Foreign ownership is defined as y i =T i US /T i M -1, which is the ratio of firm i's weight in the U.S. equity portfolio to its weight in the world portfolio, minus one. Also shown are tstatistics from bivariate regressions with foreign ownership as the dependent variable is shown. Market capitalization is in millions of U.S. dollars. Average investable weight is the average of the 1997:06 and 1997:12 weights given a security in the IFC investable index. Market capitalization, investable weight, and turnover rate come from the Emerging Markets Database. All other characteristics are found in the Worldscope database. *** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 3 presents regression results where the dependent variable is y i = T i F /T i M -1, which is the ratio of firm i's weight in the U.S. equity portfolio to its weight in the world portfolio, minus one. The absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *** , **
, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 presents results of a probit regression where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm was cross-listed on a U.S. exchange and 0, otherwise. The absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
*** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 5 presents the results of a regression of the change in y (defined in Table 3 ) on changes in explanatory variables. The absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
